[cabf_validation] domain registrar as an applicant
Adriano Santoni
adriano.santoni at staff.aruba.it
Mon Oct 22 06:23:59 MST 2018
In fact, I cannot describe any such process based on the current BRs.
Just wanted to see if anybody had a different opinion...
Il 22/10/2018 15:10, Ryan Sleevi ha scritto:
> I think any CA advocating that would need to describe under 3.2.2.4
> which method they're using to validate. Could you explain a process
> that a CA could use that compiles with one of the 3.2.2.4 validation
> methods that meets that?
>
> There had been some discussion about proposing additional methods -
> what, during the validation work, had been suggested as "3.2.2.4.13",
> which was a modification proposed by Peter Bowen at Amazon that would
> have allowed greater flexibility while still achieving the same
> security objectives of 3.2.2.4.12, in a more interoperable way.
> However, Peter didn't push that forward as .13, and no other member
> stepped up to do so.
>
> On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 5:25 AM Adriano Santoni via Validation
> <validation at cabforum.org <mailto:validation at cabforum.org>> wrote:
>
> All,
>
> I'd like to get some opinions on the following doubt.
>
> Can it be inferred, from the BRs, that the entity which is is
> officialy designated (e.g. by governmental acts) as the /unique/
> registrar of a certain domain also /controls/ that domain and is
> therefore "entitled" (subject to the remaining checks required by
> the BRs) to receive SSL server certificates for such domain and
> all subdomains thereof? I mean, can we draw this conclusion based
> on "just" the official documental evidences (e.g. by governmental
> acts) ? Section 3.2.2.4 of the BRs seems not to allow that - or
> not too clearly, at any rate.
>
> (Please note that I am not referring to the particular
> circumstance addressed by 3.2.2.4.12 of the BRs)
>
> Adriano
>
>
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