[cabf_validation] [EXTERNAL]Re: Ballot Proposal: Validation Method in certificatePolicies

Tue Aug 7 10:59:58 MST 2018

The complexity I’m willing to avoid is requiring both formats.  What I’m not willing to do is not allow the usage of ROIDs.

I will vote against any proposal that does not allow the use of ROIDs.  Whether absolute OIDs should be allowed or not, I feel less strongly about and could go either way.

-Tim

From: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com> 
Sent: Tuesday, August 7, 2018 11:54 AM
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>
Cc: Wayne Thayer <wthayer at mozilla.com>; CA/Browser Forum Validation WG List <validation at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [cabf_validation] [EXTERNAL]Re: Ballot Proposal: Validation Method in certificatePolicies

I'm not sure I understand your reply.

The complexity I mention is precisely because of requiring the relative OID. I'm afraid you may have taken the opposite meaning of my message.

On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 11:34 AM Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> > wrote:

I agree with Wayne, I think it might make sense to just require the use of the relative OID, to avoid the complexity you mention.

-Tim

From: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com> > 
Sent: Monday, August 6, 2018 11:05 AM
To: Wayne Thayer <wthayer at mozilla.com <mailto:wthayer at mozilla.com> >; CA/Browser Forum Validation WG List <validation at cabforum.org <mailto:validation at cabforum.org> >
Cc: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> >
Subject: Re: [cabf_validation] [EXTERNAL]Re: Ballot Proposal: Validation Method in certificatePolicies

It would be clearer, and easier, to use the absolute form. The relative form is a nightmare to deal with in client software - because it's not used in any widely used X.509 extension (AFAICT). Certainly, NSS does not support decoding that type 

Further, in ASN.1, "RELATIVE OID" is a distinct type and tag than OBJECT IDENTIFIER (0x06 vs 0x0D). Thus the proposed language "MAY" requires a separate ASN.1 syntax (such as a CHOICE OF) to support the optionality, and will require updates to client software to support. This may be easier with implicit tagging rather than explicit, to avoid parsing issues on the unhandled relative OIDs, but... it's better to just not bother with it.

On Fri, Aug 3, 2018 at 2:42 PM Wayne Thayer via Validation <validation at cabforum.org <mailto:validation at cabforum.org> > wrote:

On Fri, Aug 3, 2018 at 11:30 AM Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek at digicert.com> > wrote:

I’ll endorse.

> 

Thanks. Anyone else?

> 

I think you just want:

BRValidationMethodSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId

DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

I think there’s a way to express the concept that DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId MUST be a child of { 2.23.140.1.11 } via ASN.1 constraints, but I can’t do it.  It might be better anyway just to be handle that constraint outside of the ASN.1.

The ballot should make explicit that relative OIDs are allowed in addition to absolute OIDs, and if relative forms of OIDs are used, the forms MUST be relative to the prefix { 2.23.140.1.2 }.  That’ll make the encoding much smaller.

So maybe something like:

“BRValidationMethodSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId

DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId OIDs MUST be a child of 2.23.140.1.2.4 or 2.23.140.1.2.5, and MAY appear in relative form, relative to 2.23.140.1.2.”

> 

Would it be better to just require the use of relative form? I think so.

> 

-Tim

From: Validation <validation-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:validation-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via Validation
Sent: Thursday, August 2, 2018 8:05 PM
To: CA/Browser Forum Validation WG List <validation at cabforum.org <mailto:validation at cabforum.org> >
Subject: Re: [cabf_validation] [EXTERNAL]Re: Ballot Proposal: Validation Method in certificatePolicies

I've addressed all the feedback that I have received in the version of the ballot below and at [1].

I'm a complete rookie at ABNF and I've almost certainly botched the syntax. Can someone help me get the encoding right?

I'm also looking for two endorsers, and of course, any additional feedback.

- Wayne

==========================================================

Ballot SC#: Validation Method Encoded in Certificates

Purpose of Ballot: The methods defined in BR section 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 to confirm control or ownership of each domain name or IP address placed in a TLS certificate have varying security properties. This ballot proposes a standard format for expressing the method(s) the CA used to validate domain control or ownership of the Authorization Domain Name(s) placed in a certificate, and requires conforming CAs to include this information in certificates issued on or after July 1, 2019. This information is useful for quantification and analysis when vulnerabilities in specific methods are identified, and disclosing it will benefit the PKI ecosystem. As specified, this information is not useful or intended for making trust decisions in user agents.

The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and endorsed by XXX of YYY and XXX of YYY.

— MOTION BEGINS –
This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based upon Version 1.5.7:

Add the following definitions to section 1.2:

{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐ requirements(2) domain-validation-methods(4)} (2.23.140.1.2.4). 
{joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2) international‐organizations(23) ca‐browser‐forum(140) certificate‐policies(1) baseline‐ requirements(2) IP-address-validation-methods(5)} (2.23.140.1.2.5). 

Add section 7.1.2.3(g), as follows:

This extension MUST be present and SHOULD NOT be marked critical.
g.   cabf-BRValidationMethod (2.23.140.1.11) (required on or after April 1, 2019)

This extension contains a list of one or more OIDs that assert every distinct method performed by the CA to validate domain control or ownership of each FQDN contained in the certificate's subjectAlternativeName. If an FQDN has been validated using multiple methods, the CA MAY assert more than one of the methods. This extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical.

These OIDs representing validation methods SHALL be defined as follows:
    * 2.23.140.1.2.4. concatenated with the subsection number of section 3.2.2.4 corresponding to the domain validation method that was used to validate one or more subjectAlternativeNames in this certificate (e.g. 2.23.140.1.2.4.2'); or,

    * 2.23.140.1.2.5 concatenated with the subsection number of section 3.2.2.5 corresponding to the IP address validation method that was used to validate one or more subjectAlternativeNames in the certificate (e.g. '2.23.140.1.2.5.1').

OIDs representing validation methods MUST be encoded in this extension as follows:

cabf-BRValidationMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2.23.140.1.11 }

BRValidationMethodSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId

DomainOrIpAddressValidationMethodId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

— MOTION ENDS –

[1] https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master...wthayer:Ballot226#diff-7f6d14a20e7f3beb696b45e1bf8196f2

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