[cabfpub] Obtaining an EV cert for phishing

Christian Heutger ch at psw.net
Tue Nov 28 18:35:36 UTC 2017


It also means that a crime favours another crime, and that is exactly how criminals are caught, because they leave their mark, the more so, the better, because it makes it easier to get to the bottom of it. If you were to skip steps now, you would also deprive yourself of opportunities to hunt down criminals.

Von: Public <public-bounces at cabforum.org> im Auftrag von Ryan Sleevi via Public <public at cabforum.org>
Antworten an: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com>, CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public at cabforum.org>
Datum: Dienstag, 28. November 2017 um 19:26
An: Ben Wilson <ben.wilson at digicert.com>, CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public at cabforum.org>
Betreff: Re: [cabfpub] Obtaining an EV cert for phishing

Just to square these comments:

Kirk's position was that EV certificates provide a way of tracking those who'd commit crime online because they have to disclose identity.
Gerv and James pointed out that the identity information is only as useful as it is vetted, and there's scenarios where the vetting may not be rigorous.
Ben pointed out that it'd be a crime to lie to the government (although, as a broad statement, this varies by jurisdiction)

By combining these views, it seems like we're in agreement that criminals who are willing to commit crime may need to commit crime to commit crime. That doesn't seem like the requirement to commit crime would deter a criminal from committing crime, but what do I know - I'm not a criminal (I don't think...)

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 12:50 PM, Ben Wilson via Public <public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>> wrote:
Gerv wrote: I would say that the EV Guidelines allow EV issuers to trust things which are QGISes because there's an assumption that information in a Government information source will have had some level of checking.

I'd disagree.  QGISes are relied upon because everyone relies on them because lying to the government is a crime.


-----Original Message-----
From: Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org>] On Behalf Of Gervase Markham via Public
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2017 10:46 AM
To: Kirk Hall <Kirk.Hall at entrustdatacard.com<mailto:Kirk.Hall at entrustdatacard.com>>; James Burton <james at sirburton.com<mailto:james at sirburton.com>>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Obtaining an EV cert for phishing

Hi Kirk,

On 28/11/17 17:03, Kirk Hall wrote:
> Thanks for the additional information, James.  In the end, the EV
> Guidelines did exactly what they were designed to do – they provided a
> way for the public to find you (as the company owner) if you used your
> EV certificate and domain to do something wrong.

They did, but only because he was honest. He is pointing out that it may not be difficult, due to the lack of checking, for a dishonest person to use fake information. I do think that's an issue of concern.

I would say that the EV Guidelines allow EV issuers to trust things which are QGISes because there's an assumption that information in a Government information source will have had some level of checking. But it seems from this experience that this is not true in all cases. That concerns me. Do we have to agree that Companies House is not a valid QGIS?

This is not a phishing issue, it's a more general "integrity of the EV process" issue.

Gerv
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