[cabfpub] Draft Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates: User input

Gervase Markham gerv at mozilla.org
Fri Feb 10 09:50:51 UTC 2017

On 09/02/17 17:31, Christian Heutger via Public wrote:
> I don’t believe, moving faster is required for normal situations. If
> there are issues arising needing faster reaction, revocation and
> reissue is still a possible way. For normal situations, enterprises
> need to be able to react and they can’t move faster. Why are most
> enterprises skipping one Windows version and roll out the next one?
> As they are not able to move faster in controlled enterprise security
> environments.

If the effort of replacing a certificate is equivalent to the effort of
deploying a new version of Windows, then something is very wrong in that

We need to get to a place where replacing the security certificate in
_any_ server or appliance is a simple and easily-automatable job. How do
you propose we get there?

> As I understood the discussion, 1 year is the first step on a road to
> months or weeks.

Well, if you still haven't sorted out automation by the time someone
proposes months or weeks, you can oppose it then :-)

>> I'm sure there are plenty of CAs, big and small, who would assert
>> their automation solutions are secure. :-)
> But as you know, there is nothing, which is 100% secure and if we
> talk about certificates in their sense of encryption and(!) identity
> assurance, such job shouldn’t be based on automatism.

I suspect you will find that automated systems are, in fact, more
reliable and secure than manual ones. People doing things manually can
make mistakes. This is why sysadmins like automation.


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