[cabf_validation] [EXTERNAL]Re: Revision to OU requirements

[Paul Walsh]

> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:08 PM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr>> wrote:
> 
> It's also unambiguously clear that parts in a TLS Certificates that are not related to a Domain Name, are not part of the "processing model used in TLS to validate a domain name". You have been advocating that, for any Identity Information included in TLS Certificates, yet there are cases where this information is used.
> 
> Not by browsers. Which is precisely why it doesn't belong in the TLS certificates used, by browsers, to connect to a server.

[PW] I’m sorry if I’m asking a specific question that has been answered already. I’m really hoping to learn more about this particular issue. Even if I get a response that’s not to my understanding or liking, I’ll simply digest it, and leave it at that :)

Referring only to fields that browsers don’t use - are there any fields that have been empty, or populated incorrectly in the past, that resulted in a security problem for one or more organization? 

If yes, is it possible to get a link to a news website or company blog where the security incident was announced? I’d also love to learn how those fields caused a problem if they’re not used by browsers.

If a browser doesn’t need specific fields, can’t they just ignore them and allow other certificate consumers to use them? 

For example, a mobile carrier might want to consume certificates that contain one or two specific fields that browser vendors don’t use/trust, while ignoring the encryption aspect of the cert. I know of a few new implementations for identity information that are going to use an API and metadata, but from an industry perspective, I’d like to see existing certificates consumed in ways that add more internet safety further down the tech stack - before the browser even sees it. 

If we were all discussing this for the first time, I would favor non-TLS for identity information, but the certificates are out there being used already. Alternative solutions do exist, but there’s room for multiple approaches. 

Thanks,
Paul

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