[cabf_validation] Using 3.2.2.4.2/.3 for future domains

[Wayne Thayer]

On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Peter Bowen via Validation <
validation at cabforum.org> wrote:

> On Mar 17, 2018, at 7:43 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Consider the use of .7, in which we already permit (by virtue of CNAME)
> an expression of delegation to a separate entity via DNS.
>
> From my understanding of the problem, this may be a solution that works
for everyone. Is it correct that under the existing .7, a CA could instruct
their customer to create a DNS CNAME in the 'example.com' zone for '_www'
that points to a DNS record controlled by the CA (e.g. '
account1234.validation.megaca.com'), then perform .7 domain validation in
perpetuity for 'www.example.com' without any interaction from the DN
Registrant?

> If the entire concern is that the respondant in WHOIS is not the PKI
> approver (preventing .2 and .3), and that the domain operator "for reasons"
> cannot configure one of the mailboxes (.4), would the expression of a
> domain record that allowed for a designated approver suffice? This could be
> established for all new/additional domains, can be verified technically,
> can be checked, and is "no worse" than setting a mailbox under .2/.4 or a
> CNAME under .7 to delegate to a PKI approver. Does this meet the needs?
>
> My example above doesn't work for the Base Domain, so this makes sense.
What would this special domain record contain?

> Or consider during the F2F, there was a discussion of expanding .12 in a
> way that the DNS Owner could put in a "challenge token" (of sorts) into
> WHOIS, which allowed them to uniquely and unambiguously link back to the
> notion of a CA account. Would such a link - in which the CA validated the
> existence (under the proposed ".13" rules, to be fleshed out) of this
> random token - suitably replace the need to do an organization-identity
> link? I think so.
>
> However, if the proposal of the .1 supporters is that they should not have
> to consult DNS to verify an explicit authorization to delegate - such as a
> DNS record or (additional) WHOIS configuration - and instead rely on the
> mere existence of information that ICANN requires of domain holders - then
> that will remain unacceptable, as it's a fundamentally weak proposition.
>
> I agree that an explicit authorization (similar to the approach proposed
to "fix" .9 and .10) is much better, and I also question how useful an
implicit but unambiguous WHOIS record match is outside of specific ccTLDs
like the .no example we keep tossing around.

These are both things worth introducing to the BRs and seeing if they meet
> needs.
>
> If my understanding of the proposal above is in the ballpark, then the
combination of these two with the new .12 seem to cover most of what was
lost with #1. What do CAs who've been using .1 think?

We should be biased towards including more validation methods in the BRs if
> they meet the bar for security, rather than trying to limit the number of
> options.  The BRs are very different from IETF RFCs as they are mandatory
> and validation methods are a closed set, so we cannot reasonably say “at
> least two independent interoperable implementations” as we likely won’t
> even have the first implementation of a method until well after a method is
> approved.
>
> I put text forward for the .13 method in another email.  I hope that we
> can get it to a ballot soon so we can start to try it i the real world.  I
> also think DNS discovery of delegation of approval that you propose seems
> like a good path; it has the potential to allow delegation via multiple
> protocols via URI, which could offer a number of opportunities to improve
> the system.
>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>
>
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