[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins: Ballot SC-076v2 "Clarify and Improve OCSP Requirements"

[Ben Wilson]

Mozilla votes "yes" in favor of Ballot SC-076v2.

> *Purpose of Ballot*
>
> This is v2 of this ballot; you can see the discussion thread for v1 here:
> https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-August/004798.html
>
> This ballot attempts to address three concerns:
> - The confusion around "reserved" serials, which do not actually exist
> because all Precertificate serials are assumed to also exist in
> corresponding Certificates and are therefore actually "assigned";
> - Confusion around whether, and how quickly, OCSP responders must begin
> providing authoritative responses for Certificates and Precertificates; and
> - Confusion around whether and how the OCSP requirements apply to
> Certificates which do not contain an AIA OCSP URL, but for which the CA's
> OCSP responder is still willing to provide responses.
>
> These concerns have been previously discussed in this Mozilla policy bug
> <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/280>, this ServerCert WG bug
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/issues/422>, and this Bugzilla
> incident <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1905419>.
>
> It addresses these concerns by:
> - Stating that OCSP responses must be available within 15 minutes of
> signing a certificate containing an AIA OCSP URL;
> - Removing the concept of a "reserved" serial entirely;
> - Moving all OCSP requirements into Section 4.9.9, leaving Section 4.9.10
> (which RFC 3647 says is meant to place requirements on relying parties, not
> on CAs) empty; and
> - Organizing the requirements in Section 4.9.9 into three clusters:
>   - Definitions of "validity interval", "assigned", and "unassigned";
>   - Requirements on OCSP Responders, which apply only to responses from
> AIA OCSP URLs found in issued certs; and
>   - Requirements on OCSP Responses, which apply to all responses
> regardless of whether the certificate in question has an AIA OCSP URL.
>
> GitHub PR representing this ballot:
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/535
> Rendered view of the resulting text:
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3/docs/BR.md#499-on-line-revocationstatus-checking-availability
>
> *Motion*
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Aaron Gable (Let's Encrypt /
> ISRG), and is endorsed by Ben Wilson (Mozilla) and Antonis Eleftheriadis
> (HARICA).
>
> *Motion Begins*
>
> Modify the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
> Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates", based on Version 2.0.6, as
> specified in the following redline:
>
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/929d9b4a1ed1f13f92f6af672ad6f6a2153b8230...a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3
>
> *Motion Ends*
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
> approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
>
> *Discussion Period (at least 7 days) *
>
> Start: August 29, 2024 19:00 UTC
> End: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC
>
> *Voting Period (7 days)*
>
> Start: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC
> End: October 3, 2024 19:00 UTC
>
> _______________________________________________
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>
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>
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