[Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-080 V1: "Sunsetting use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts"

[Mike Shaver]

Thanks for the action on this.

Should this ballot include guidance or instruction for CAs who have been
using Whois DCV previously? Are we content to simply let Whois-validated
certs expire, or should CAs revalidate domain control for relevant certs
using an approved method? If domain control can be validated, then I don’t
think there would be any need to revoke/reissue (unless the CPS calls out
Whois DCV maybe? I don’t know of any such). If it *can’t* be revalidated,
then revoking the certificate is probably appropriate!

Mike

On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 12:15 PM Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg <
servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:

> Purpose of Ballot SC-080 V1:
>
>
>
> This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the
> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates
> (i.e., TLS BRs) related to sunsetting the use of WHOIS when identifying
> Domain Contacts.
>
>
> Background:
>
>
> In light of recent events where research from WatchTowr Labs demonstrated
> how threat actors could exploit WHOIS to obtain fraudulently issued TLS
> certificates [1] and follow-on discussions in MDSP [2][3], we drafted an
> introductory proposal [4] to sunset the use of WHOIS for identifying Domain
> Contacts.
>
>
> The proposal sets a prohibition against relying on WHOIS to identify
> Domain Contacts beginning 11/1/2024. At the same time, it also prohibits
> use of DCV reuse where WHOIS was used as the source of truth for a Domain
> Contact.
>
>
>
> Proposal Revision History:
>
>
>    - Pre-Ballot Version #1 [4]
>
>
>
> Previous Versions of this Ballot:
>
>
>    - N/A
>
>
> References:
>
> [1]
> https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/
>
> [2]
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U
>
> [3]
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA
>
> [4] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/548
>
> [5]
> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1IXL8Yk12gPQs8GXiosXCPLPgATJilaiVy-f9SbsMA28/edit?gid=268412787#gid=268412787
>
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Dickson and Chris Clements
> of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Arvid Vermote (GlobalSign)
> and Pedro Fuentes (OISTE).
>
>
> — Motion Begins —
>
>
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
> Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline
> Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.7.
>
>
>
> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
>
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..356799f0dcfe11deb0a375a11233403236ab72c9
>
>
>
> — Motion Ends —
>
>
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
> approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
>
>
> Discussion (7 days)
>
> - Start: 2024-09-16 16:00:00 UTC
>
> - End no earlier than: 2024-09-23 16:00:00 UTC
>
>
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> - Start: TBD
>
> - End: TBD
>
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
>
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