[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 - Pre-sign linting

Tue May 21 08:34:55 UTC 2024

My concern with a stronger position is that these linters are developed on a voluntary basis that may not be updated for some time and not be compliant with the latest changes/developments (we´ve seen that not all linters cover it all and therefore some CAs are using several at a time).

But I do agree with and like your second point/proposal. A way to evaluate new linters/versions and be ready for adoption at a certain stage or for different cert types but written in a way that can not be a way out in case of a mis-issuance and to blame the linter (and hence the developer) for it.

De: Ryan Dickson <ryandickson at google.com> 
Enviado el: lunes, 20 de mayo de 2024 21:35
Para: Inigo Barreira <Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
CC: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr>
Asunto: Re: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 - Pre-sign linting

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Hi Dimitris, Corey, and Ben,

Thank you for bringing this ballot forward for the group’s consideration.

A few questions:

*	Given the perceived value of linting, should we consider a stronger position on its adoption (i.e., MUST versus SHOULD)? While I recognize that the Baseline Requirements represent minimum expectations, consistent and reliable adoption of linting seems to provide the ecosystem with the best chance of addressing the problem statement described in the ballot summary.

*	To accomplish this goal, the ballot could be modified to require use of linting (either tbs certificate linting, pre-certificate linting, or final certificate linting), with tbs certificate linting being considered RECOMMENDED and final certificate linting as being considered NOT RECOMMENDED.
*	This goal could be further realized by either a (1) phased-implementation (i.e., SHOULD now, MUST later) - or (2) a forward-looking effective date that considers a reasonable timeline for adoption for those CA Owners looking to adhere to the BRs that do not perform linting today.

*	Is it worth more clearly establishing expectations for the evaluation and, when applicable, deployment of updates made by or to linting tools. For example, can we establish a reasonable expectation that within 30(?) days after an update has been made to a linting tool relied upon by a CA, it has either (1) been adopted in the production issuance environment - or (2) considered not applicable given the scope of recent updates (for example, if a CA only issues DV certificates, and the most recent update only pertains to EV certificates, there is no expectation that the updated version is deployed). 

Thanks for your consideration.

- Ryan

On Mon, May 20, 2024 at 2:04 PM Inigo Barreira via Servercert-wg < <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:

Hi Dimitris,

I don´t know if the “(help to improve)” is adding any additional hidden requirement. IMO, I´d remove that.

Regards

De: Servercert-wg < <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> En nombre de Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
Enviado el: lunes, 20 de mayo de 2024 19:57
Para: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List < <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Asunto: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 - Pre-sign linting

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SC-75 Pre-sign linting

Summary

There have been numerous compliance incidents publicly disclosed by CAs in which they failed to comply with the technical requirements described in standards associated with the issuance and management of publicly-trusted TLS Certificates. However, the industry has developed open-source tools, linters, that are free to use and can help CAs avoid certificate misissuance. Using such linters before issuing a precertificate from a Publicly-Trusted CA (pre-issuance linting) can prevent the mis-issuance in a wide variety of cases.

The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of Digicert and Ben Wilson of Mozilla.

You can view the GitHub pull request representing this ballot  <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fservercert%2Fpull%2F518&data=05%7C02%7CInigo.Barreira%40sectigo.com%7C466f1caa04b14ed924e608dc79041680%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638518305682768229%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=2SFUVw8u52y09kq2VzzBFli50cAgn02n2BUYS1dG08E%3D&reserved=0> here. 

Motion Begins

MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates" based on Version 2.0.4 as specified in the following redline:

*	https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/049237e096650fe01f67780b7c24bd5211ee3038...ada5d6e0db76b32be28d64edd7b0677bbef9c2f5 

Motion Ends

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (at least 7 days)

*	Start time: 2024-05-20 18:00:00 UTC
*	End time: on or after 2024-05-27 18:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

*	Start time: TBD
*	End time: TBD

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