[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion Certificates

[Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)]

It could also theoretically be used for IV certificates too, right? It kind of defeats the purpose of TOR but who knows🙂

Dimitris. 

-----Original Message-----
From: Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
To: servercert-wg at cabforum.org
Sent: Sat, 25 Jan 2020 1:49
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion Certificates

This begins the discussion period for ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion
Certificates

Purpose of Ballot:

This ballot will permit CAs to issue DV and OV certificates containing Tor
onion addresses using the newer version 3 naming format.

In ballot 144, later clarified by ballots 198/201, the Forum created rules
for issuing EV certificates containing onion addresses. A primary reason
for requiring EV level validation was that onion addresses were
cryptographically weak, relying on RSA-1024 and SHA-1. More recently a
newer "version 3" addressing scheme has removed these weaknesses. For much
the same reason that EV certificates are not always a viable option for
website operators (e.g. sites operated by individuals), many onion sites
would benefit from the availability of DV and OV certificates for version 3
onion addresses.

The Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension required in the EV Guidelines to
contain the full hash of the keys related to the .onion address is no
longer needed as this hash is part of the version 3 address.

Older version 2 onion addresses are still in use, so this ballot does not
remove the existing EV Guidelines requirements for onion names.

Reference to discussion of EV onion certificates:
https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2014-November/004569.html

Reference to reasons we required EV in the past:
https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-November/006213.html

Reference to prior discussion of this topic:
https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/012451.html


The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and
endorsed by Roland Shoemaker of Let's Encrypt and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of
HARICA.


-- MOTION BEGINS --

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version
1.6.7, or based on Version 1.6.7 as modified by ballot SC25:

ADD a paragraph to section 3.2.2.4 of the Baseline Requirements as defined
in the following redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..fded04ad7f0390931d38af225bea46a4742fb631

ADD Appendix C to the Baseline Requirements as defined in the following
redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..fded04ad7f0390931d38af225bea46a4742fb631


This ballot modifies the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of
Extended Validation Certificates" as follows based on version 1.7.1:

MODIFY Appendix F as defined in the following redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..fded04ad7f0390931d38af225bea46a4742fb631

-- MOTION ENDS --


This ballot proposes two Final Maintenance Guidelines.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: 25-January 2020 00:00 UTC

End Time: No earlier than 01-February 2020 00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: TBD

End Time: TBD
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