[Servercert-wg] 回复: Voting Begins: Ballot SC27v3: Version 3 Onion Certificates

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SHECA votes Yes on ballot SC27v3.



Regards，
Toria Chen
----------------
Chen Xiaotong  Dept. of Internal Control & Compliance
Shanghai Electronic Certificate Authority Center Co.,Ltd.
Add: 18th Floor,No.1717NorthSichuanRd. Shanghai, China
Tel: (008621)36393197          Fax: (008621)36393200
Mobile: (0086)13161992678 E-mail: chenxiaotong at sheca.com
________________________________
发件人: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> 代表 Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
发送时间: 2020年2月13日 4:00
收件人: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
主题: [Servercert-wg] Voting Begins: Ballot SC27v3: Version 3 Onion Certificates

This begins the voting period for Version 3 of ballot SC27: Version 3 Onion Certificates

Purpose of Ballot:

This ballot will permit CAs to issue DV and OV certificates containing Tor onion addresses using the newer version 3 naming format.

In ballot 144, later clarified by ballots 198/201, the Forum created rules for issuing EV certificates containing onion addresses. A primary reason for requiring EV level validation was that onion addresses were cryptographically weak, relying on RSA-1024 and SHA-1. More recently a newer "version 3" addressing scheme has removed these weaknesses. For much the same reason that EV certificates are not always a viable option for website operators (e.g. sites operated by individuals), many onion sites would benefit from the availability of DV and OV certificates for version 3 onion addresses.

The Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension required in the EV Guidelines to contain the full hash of the keys related to the .onion address is no longer needed as this hash is part of the version 3 address.

Older version 2 onion addresses are still in use, so this ballot does not remove the existing EV Guidelines requirements for onion names.

Reference to discussion of EV onion certificates: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2014-November/004569.html

Reference to reasons we required EV in the past: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-November/006213.html

Reference to prior discussion of this topic: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/012451.html


The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and endorsed by Roland Shoemaker of Let's Encrypt and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA.


-- MOTION BEGINS --

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version 1.6.7, or based on Version 1.6.7 as modified by ballot SC25:

ADD a paragraph to section 3.2.2.4 of the Baseline Requirements as defined in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..f7a2dba4a2dd6b7209c71c862ad68dca960b6de9

ADD Appendix C to the Baseline Requirements as defined in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..f7a2dba4a2dd6b7209c71c862ad68dca960b6de9


This ballot modifies the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates" as follows based on version 1.7.1:

MODIFY Appendix F as defined in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9bb78a193266f8d1465de1ee5a1acf5d184..f7a2dba4a2dd6b7209c71c862ad68dca960b6de9

-- MOTION ENDS --


This ballot proposes two Final Maintenance Guidelines.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: 25-January 2020 00:00 UTC

End Time: 12-February 2020 20:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: 12-February 2020 20:00 UTC

End Time:  19-February 2020 20:00 UTC
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