[cabfpub] Draft Ballot 186 - Limiting the Reuse of Validation Information

[Ryan Sleevi]

On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 9:00 PM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com> wrote:

> Similarly, I'm looking for two endorsers to publicly endorse this ballot.
>
> Background:
> This Ballot is complementary to, but distinct from, Ballot 185, but itself
> represents a significant impediment towards improving online security. The
> Baseline Requirements only require that a CA validate a domain name once
> every 39 months, and that presently (notwithstanding Ballot 185), such
> certificates may have a validity period of up to 39 months. This
> effectively means that a CA may validate a domain once, and issue any
> number of certificates for an effective validity period of 74 months, minus
> a day.
>
> To prevent further misissuance for domains in the event of transfer of
> control, whether through sale or the registration lapsing, as well as to
> ensure that newly issued certificates reflect industry best practice for
> domain validation, rather than reusing information from insecure or
> forbidden validation methods, this Ballot significantly reforms the reuse
> of validated information.
>
> Notably, the modifications to the EV Guidelines fully removes the ability
> to simply use the mere existence of a certificate to justify issuance;
> instead, it reforms the domain authorization to allow the use of
> information from Section 11.14.3, subject to the existing lifetime
> concerns. In practice, this should cause no issues and be indistinguishable
> from a sunset date, but has the added benefit of resolving the ambiguity
> for EV certificates for domains which do not provide accessible WHOIS
> datasources.
>
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google, Inc and
> endorsed by ___ of ___ and ___ of ___ to introduce new Final Maintenance
> Guidelines for the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the
> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" and the
> "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation
> Certificates"
>
> -- MOTION BEGINS --
> Modify Section 4.2.1 of the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for
> the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" as follows:
>
> Replace the following paragraph:
> """
> Section 6.3.2 limits the validity period of Subscriber Certificates. The
> CA MAY use the documents and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify
> certificate information, provided that the CA obtained the data or document
> from a source specified under Section 3.2 no more than thirty‐nine (39)
> months prior to issuing the Certificate.
> """
>
> with:
> """
> Section 6.3.2 limits the Validity Period of Subscriber Certificates.
>
> For certificates issued prior to 1 May 2017, the CA MAY use the documents
> and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify certificate information,
> provided that the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified
> under Section 3.2 no more than thirty‐nine (39) months prior to issuing the
> Certificate.
>
> For certificates issued on or after 1 May 2017, the CA MAY use the
> documents and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify certificate
> information if the documents or data meet all of the following criteria:
>   1. The CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under
> Section 3.2 no more than thirteen (13) months prior to issuing the
> Certificate.
>   2. The method used to obtain the document or data was acceptable under
> Section 3.2 at the time the document or data was obtained.
>   3. The method used to obtain the document or data is acceptable under
> Section 3.2 at the time the documents or data is used to verify certificate
> information.
>   4. The CA has not revoked any certificates which contain certificate
> information verified using the document or data.
> """
>
> Modify Section 11.14.1 of the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management
> of Extended Validation Certificates" as follows:
>
> Delete the following item:
> """
> (6) The Applicant's right to use the specified Domain Name under Section
> 11.7, provided that the CA verifies that the WHOIS record still shows the
> same registrant as when the CA verified the specified Domain Name for the
> initial EV Certificate.
> """
>
> Modify Section 11.14.3 of the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management
> of Extended Validation Certificates" as follows:
>
> Add the following item:
> """
> (5) The CA MUST ensure that any documents or data used to support the
> issuance of an EV Certificate complies with the requirements and limits set
> forth in Section 6.3.2 of the Baseline Requirements.
> """
>

And of course, despite much proofreading, there's no greater highlighter
for errors than the "Send" button. This "Section 6.3.2" should instead
reference "Section 4.2.1" (that is, it incorporates by reference the limits
of reusing validated information, rather than incorporating by reference
the validity lifetimes)


>
> -- MOTION ENDS --
>
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