[cabfpub] FW: Question 3 – Domain Validation pre-ballot

kirk_hall at trendmicro.com kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
Wed Nov 18 19:02:15 UTC 2015


While I understand your point, I think it is (more or less) covered today by existing language elsewhere, and I don’t think we should make the changes you suggest.  Here are two beginning Definitions in the Baseline Requirements:

Applicant: The natural person or Legal Entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber. For Certificates issued to devices, the
Applicant is the entity that controls or operates the device named in the Certificate, even if the device is sending the actual certificate request.

Applicant Representative: A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant: (i) who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (ii) who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (iii) who acknowledges and agrees to the Certificate Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA.

Subscriber Agreement: An agreement between the CA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties.

Subscriber: A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber or Terms of Use Agreement.

We also use the term Applicant in many other places in ways that make it clear the Applicant is the subject of the certificate being applied for, not the web hoster acting as the agent of the (real) Applicant.  For example, BR 3.2.2.1:

3.2.2.1. Identity
If the Subject Identity Information is to include the name or address of an organization, the CA SHALL verify
the identity and address of the organization and that the address is the Applicant’s address of existence or
operation. The CA SHALL verify the identity and address of the Applicant using documentation provided by,
or through communication with, at least one of the following:
1. A government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant’s legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A third party database that is periodically updated and considered a Reliable Data Source;
3. A site visit by the CA or a third party who is acting as an agent for the CA; or
4. An Attestation Letter.
The CA MAY use the same documentation or communication described in 1 through 4 above to verify both
the Applicant’s identity and address.
Alternatively, the CA MAY verify the address of the Applicant (but not the identity of the Applicant) using a
utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement, government‐issued tax document, or other form of
identification that the CA determines to be reliable.

We also require important warranties from the “Applicant” including ongoing obligations – those are intended to bind the domain owner as Applicant, and not the web hoster.  Notice the underlined language below recognizes that an “agent” of the applicant may be authorized to agree to the warranty terms for the Applicant:

9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties
The CA SHALL require, as part of the Subscriber or Terms of Use Agreement, that the Applicant make the
commitments and warranties in this section for the benefit of the CA and the Certificate Beneficiaries.
Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, the CA SHALL obtain, for the express benefit of the CA and the Certificate
Beneficiaries, either:
1. The Applicant’s agreement to the Subscriber Agreement with the CA, or
2. The Applicant’s agreement to the Terms of Use agreement. ***
The Subscriber or Terms of Use Agreement MUST contain provisions imposing on the Applicant itself (or
made by the Applicant on behalf of its principal or agent under a subcontractor or hosting service
relationship) the following obligations and warranties:
1. Accuracy of Information: ***
2. Protection of Private Key: ***;
3. Acceptance of Certificate: ***;
4. Use of Certificate: ***
5. Reporting and Revocation: ***

Everyone is well aware that web hosters may act as agents for the (real) Applicant, and I think that is covered in the existing definition of Applicant Representative (see underlined text).  The assumption has always been that the web hoster has an agreement with the domain owner to apply for a cert in the owner’s name.

So I don’t think we make things any better by amending the domain validation rules to use the phrase ““the Applicant’s authorization to obtain and manage certificates for the Domain Namespace”” if that is intended to refer to the web hoster and not to the party that is the subject of the certificate – the party that “owns or controls” the domain itself.  In fact, I think we make things more confused when the Applicant in some cases in the domain owner, and in other cases the Applicant is a web hosting company itself (not just a web hosting company acting as the agent of the domain owner).

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Kirk Hall (RD-US)
Sent: Wednesday, November 18, 2015 10:43 AM
To: CABFPub (public at cabforum.org)
Subject: [cabfpub] FW: Question 3 – Domain Validation pre-ballot

From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbowen at gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 8:50 PM
To: Kirk Hall (RD-US)
Cc: CABFPub (public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>)
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Question 3 – Domain Validation pre-ballot

(you have my permission to repost to the public list)

Kirk,

You bring up a good point about defining the Applicant.

I think that the definitions of "Subject" and "Subject Identity Information" in BR section 1.6 and the content of BR sections 3.2.2.1 and 7.4.1.2.2 make it clear that, for certificates containing an organizationName attribute in the subject distinguished name, the subject organizationName identifies the certificate Applicant.

Assuming this is accurate, I have observed that most major CAs have issued certificates where the Applicant is clearly not the same as the Domain Name Registrant (i.e. owner) of the Registered Domain Name.  Most of these certificates appear to be issued to organizations that operate as web hosters.  This strongly suggests that these CAs consider the web hoster to be the Applicant, not the Domain Name Registrant, and therefore the legal promises are clearly made by the web hoster, not the Registrant.

My rationale for the new phrase is to explicitly codify this widespread practice and document that the CA/Browser Forum recognizes that the Applicant need not be the same entity as the Domain Name Registrant.

Thanks,
Peter

On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 6:31 PM, kirk_hall at trendmicro.com<mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com> <kirk_hall at trendmicro.com<mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>> wrote:
Peter, I have tried to capture the changes you suggested in the attached documents, plus two choices of effective date.  (We will also have to make similar changes to EVGL 11.14.1 and 11.14.3 when we decide what to do about requiring revetting.)

I am not sure I’m comfortable yet with going from the idea that we are confirming “the Applicant’s domain ownership or control” (current language) to “the Applicant’s authorization to obtain and manage certificates for the Domain Namespace”.   I think the current wording limits Applicant to the owner (or in some cases, licensee) of the domain, who can then work through an agent to obtain a certificate.

Your new phrase is kind of circular, and would treat an agent (web hoster or whatever) as the Applicant – but we use Applicant lots of other places, including legal promises from the Applicant, and I am concerned that we are mixing roles – in some cases the Applicant really does own the domain and should be making the legal promises to the CA, browsers, etc., while in other cases the Applicant could be just a third party agent who doesn’t own or control the domain, and the agent can’t and shouldn’t make legal promises as the “Applicant” for the actual domain owner.

Do you really think the new phrase “the Applicant’s authorization to obtain and manage certificates for the Domain Namespace” adds any clarity?  I’m afraid it would add some ambiguity.  If we need to clarify that someone can act as Agent for the Applicant, we can do that, but only the Applicant should really be agreeing to the Subscriber Agreement, etc.

If you want to respond, please email me and I will repost.

From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbowen at gmail.com<mailto:pzbowen at gmail.com>]
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 1:31 PM
To: Kirk Hall (RD-US)
Cc: CABFPub (public at cabforum.org<mailto:public at cabforum.org>)
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Question 3 – Domain Validation pre-ballot

Kirk,
Thank you for the offer to forward comments to the group.  Overall, I think that this is excellent work and I look forward to these becoming final.  I agree that the current language of Line J makes my comment moot.  However, I do think there are a couple of other minor changes that would make the intent of validation clearer.
In Line C, under (b), insert the words “or Affiliate of the CA” after “CA”.  Many companies have different subsidiaries for different functions, so the Registrar and CA Operator might not be the same legal entity, even if customers see them as the same.
In Lines D, E, F, and G, replace "Confirming the Applicant’s domain ownership or control by" with "Confirming the Applicant’s authorization to obtain and manage certificates for the Domain Namespace by”.  This makes it clear that the purpose of the method is to confirm authorization and that Applicant does not have to be the same entity as the Domain Name Registrant.
In Line B, insert “authorization, “ before “ownership” to reflect the change in D/E/F/G.
It would also be good to clarify that the 6 months from ballot approval date is when CAs must cease to use non-compliant methods.  CAs should be able to use any of the methods in the ballot immediately upon approval.  I think the ballot additionally should clarify if existing validations using a newly non-compliant method can be reused for 39 months (as per 3.3.1) or if CAs must cease relying upon the existing validations 6 months from ballot approval.
Thanks,
Peter

On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 5:08 PM, kirk_hall at trendmicro.com<mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com> <kirk_hall at trendmicro.com<mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>> wrote:
Question 3 – Domain Validation pre-ballot

Peter Bowen Comments

Peter Bowen of Amazon did not submit specific new language, but posed the following comment about new Method No. 7 shown below:

Proposal 3: In line J of current draft (Method No. 7)

“In Item J, it suggests that the random token is only valid for a FQDN validation.

“I think DNS validation should be allowed for domain hierarchies in addition to specific FQDNs.  A domain registrant should be able to choose to approve all FQDNs under corp.example.com<http://corp.example.com> by adding a record for corp.example.com<http://corp.example.com>.”


Here is the current Ballot language for Method No. 7:



“7. Having the Applicant demonstrate control over the requested FQDN by the Applicant making a change to information in a DNS record for an Authorization Domain Name where the change is to insert a Random Value or Request Token; or “

I noted we had discussed before the problem of “kirkstore.shopping.com<http://kirkstore.shopping.com>” – Kirk might have control over the third level FQDN, but might not have control over the SLDN (Base Domain) of shopping.com<http://shopping.com>, so even though Kirk could demonstrate control for kirkstore.shopping.com<http://kirkstore.shopping.com>, he should not use that to get a cert for shopping.com<http://shopping.com>.

Doug Beattie thought that Peter might be misreading Authorization Domain Name, which is defined as follows:

“Authorization Domain Name: The Domain Name used to obtain authorization for certificate issuance or a given FQDN. The CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. If the FQDN starts with a wildcard character, then the CA MUST remove all wildcard labels from the left most portion of requested FQDN. The CA may prune zero or more labels from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the intermediate values for the purpose of domain validation.“

“Base Domain Name: The portion of an applied-for FQDN that is the first domain name node left of a registry-controlled or public suffix plus the registry-controlled or public suffix (e.g. “example.co.uk<http://example.co.uk>” or “example.com<http://example.com>”). For gTLDs, the domain www.[gTLD<http://www.%5BgTLD>] will be considered to be a Base Domain. “

Questions for Discussion:

(1) Is Doug correct that the current definition of Authorized Domain Name (see underlined text above) would already satisfy Peter’s suggestion that proving control of any FQDN by making a change to the DNS record for that FQDN is sufficient to get a certificate for any lower level domain it contains, including the SLDN or Base Domain?   If yes, are any changes needed?

(2) More generally, do the members agree with Peter’s statement that “A domain registrant should be able to choose to approve all FQDNs under corp.example.com<http://corp.example.com> by adding a [DNS]record for  corp.example.com<http://corp.example.com>.”  If not, do we need to change the definition of Authorization Domain Name to delete the language underlined above?

To Peter Bowen: If you want to comment on this issue, please email to me and I will post to the Public list.


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