[cabfpub] Proposal for modified Google SHA-1 deprecation policy

Ryan Sleevi sleevi at google.com
Fri Sep 5 13:22:40 MST 2014


This is now posted and public at
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/09/gradually-sunsetting-sha-1.html
On Sep 5, 2014 12:01 AM, "Chema López González" <clopez at firmaprofesional.com>
wrote:

> +1 to Adriano suggestion.
>
> --
> *Chema López*
> *Gestor de Proyectos - Departamento Técnico*
> *AC Firmaprofesional, S.A.*
>
> Edificio ESADECREAPOLIS - 1B13
> 08173 Sant Cugat del Vallès, Barcelona.
> T.  934 774 245
> M. 666 429 224
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 3, 2014 at 3:56 PM, Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Adriano,
>>
>> That is a great suggestions,  have you heard from Ryan on this yet?  I
>> also
>> find it hard to locate and reference the current Google Chrome baseline
>> within the long thread in the google groups discussion.
>>
>> Doug
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
>> > On Behalf Of Adriano Santoni - Actalis S.p.A.
>> > Sent: Friday, August 29, 2014 2:57 AM
>> > To: public at cabforum.org
>> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Proposal for modified Google SHA-1 deprecation
>> policy
>> >
>> > Ryan,
>> >
>> > apart from the discussion, it would be a good thing if you published
>> your
>> plan on
>> > some Google's web site (like e.g.
>> > http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy)
>> >
>> > It would be easier for CAs to show their customers in a more convincing
>> way
>> > what Google is going to do.
>> > In other words, publishing your intent on a web site would have a little
>> bit more
>> > officiality -- that would help CAs.
>> >
>> > How about that?
>> >
>> > Thank you
>> >    Adriano
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Il 29/08/2014 04:13, Ryan Sleevi ha scritto:
>> > >
>> > > Hi Kirk,
>> > >
>> > > I feel like I have sufficiently explained our concerns and motivations
>> > > throughout this thread, with both you and other CAs, that it should be
>> > > readily apparent that this neither meets our goals nor helps our
>> users.
>> > >
>> > > I appreciate your thoughtful consideration in writing it.
>> > >
>> > > Best,
>> > > Ryan
>> > >
>> > > On Aug 28, 2014 7:04 PM, "kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
>> > > <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>" <kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
>> > > <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>> wrote:
>> > >
>> > >     Ryan and Chris - here is a serious proposal for a modified Google
>> > >     SHA-1 policy.  It meets all of your stated goals.  Please give it
>> > >     some consideration.
>> > >
>> > >     1. SHA-1 certs issued on or after [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
>> > >     after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google upon
>> > >     issuance - red slash and nasty click-throughs.  (This will stop
>> > >     issuance of 2017 SHA-1 certs this fall.)
>> > >
>> > >     2. SHA-1 certs issued before [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
>> > >     after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google
>> > >     starting [March 1, 2015] - red slash only and nasty
>> > >     click-throughs.   (This will force existing websites with 2017
>> > >     SHA-1 certs to change them within the next six months).
>> > >
>> > >     Result: All 2017 SHA-1 certs will be gone by next March 2015 -
>> > >     which certainly meets your goals.  Customers with existing 2017
>> > >     certs can get through this holiday season, CAs can get the message
>> > >     out.
>> > >
>> > >     Advantages:
>> > >
>> > >     1. CAs that have never issued 2017 certs, and never will (like
>> > >     Trend Micro) and their customers are not affected - that's
>> > >     appropriate, as we have never been a part of this problem.
>> > >
>> > >     2. CAs that have issued three year SHA-1 certs expiring in 2017
>> > >     will stop by this fall.
>> > >
>> > >     3. CAs that have issued 2017 certs in the past (and their
>> > >     customers) will be affected, but will have six months to adjust.
>> > >     That will be a much smaller number of customers affected than if
>> > >     those with 2016 certs are forced to change their certs twice (in
>> > >     2014 and again in 2015).
>> > >
>> > >     4. All SHA-1 certs will likely be gone by next spring.
>> > >
>> > >     I don't think Google should spend much time worrying about how CAs
>> > >     communicate with their customers about the need to move to SHA-256
>> > >     before 2017 - that's for us to worry about, and we are all
>> > >     strongly incentivized to get the message out (selling a 2017 cert
>> > >     that doesn't work creates legal problems, and none of us wants to
>> > >     be dealing with angry SHA-1 customers in late 2016 who have to
>> > >     switch to SHA-256).  We may also be able to get behind Google's
>> > >     policy if it is revised - something that isn't the case today.
>> > >
>> > >     You mentioned somewhere that you worried that simply deprecating
>> > >     SHA-1 certs as of 2017 could create a big customer service burden
>> > >     on Google as of late 2016 or early 2017.  I don't think that's the
>> > >     case with this new proposed policy, as all the negative UI effects
>> > >     will happen in 2014-15.  Plus, I predict Google will be deluged
>> > >     with customer service complaints under your current policy, when
>> > >     thousands of websites start showing as "untrusted" in the next
>> > >     6-12 weeks.  Why not make life easier for Google with a revised
>> > >     policy?
>> > >
>> > >     So what do you think?  Can we make a change to the policy that is
>> > >     focused on the real problem (2017 certs)?
>> > >
>> > >     Thanks for your consideration.
>> > >
>> > >     */Kirk R. Hall/*
>> > >
>> > >     Operations Director, Trust Services
>> > >
>> > >     Trend Micro
>> > >
>> > >     TREND MICRO EMAIL NOTICE
>> > >     The information contained in this email and any attachments is
>> confidential
>> > >     and may be subject to copyright or other intellectual property
>> protection.
>> > >     If you are not the intended recipient, you are not authorized to
>> use
>> or
>> > >     disclose this information, and we request that you notify us by
>> reply mail or
>> > >     telephone and delete the original message from your mail system.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > _______________________________________________
>> > > Public mailing list
>> > > Public at cabforum.org
>> > > https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Public mailing list
>> > Public at cabforum.org
>> > https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Public mailing list
>> Public at cabforum.org
>> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/attachments/20140905/0b387852/attachment.html 


More information about the Public mailing list