[cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

i-barreira at izenpe.net i-barreira at izenpe.net
Thu Jan 9 12:45:34 UTC 2014


I agree with Mou. It´s a way that browser can identify the purpose of the certificate. I´m not including those OIDs in the QCs I issue, only in those that are really for SSL.

 

 

Iñigo Barreira
Responsable del Área técnica
i-barreira at izenpe.net

945067705

 

 

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De: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] En nombre de Moudrick M. Dadashov
Enviado el: viernes, 03 de enero de 2014 22:09
Para: Jeremy Rowley; 'Brown, Wendy (10421)'; 'Mads Egil Henriksveen'; public at cabforum.org
Asunto: Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

 

On 1/3/2014 9:32 PM, Jeremy Rowley wrote:

	Sorry - I got the discussion a bit off-track. The issue is not whether domain names are vetted, but the fact that the BRs do not clearly define what certs are covered.  There is a significant gray area on when certificates are exempt from the BRs.

	 

	If requiring the BR/EV OID is not a possibility, I'd define the scope as any certificate that either (i) specifies a domain name in the CN field or subjectAltName extension and includes the anyEKU or serverAuth or omits an EKU or (ii) is intended to enable SSL/TLS, as evidenced by inclusion of the serverAuth EKU.  

	 

Once again, relying on BR/EV OID would be really good solution.

Jeremy, to my understanding RFC 5280 accepts anyEKU only in combination with any other EKU but not as the only EKU:

"Certificates using applications MAY require that the extended key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to that application.

If a CA includes extended key usages to satisfy such applications, but does not wish to restrict usages of the key, the CA can include the special KeyPurposeId anyExtendedKeyUsage ***in addition to the particular key purposes required by the applications***.

So based on this:
SSL server: = SAN + serverAuth + [anyEKU+EKU]
SSL client:= [SAN] +clientAuth + [anyEKU+EKU]

Thanks,
M.D.




Although the definition needs word smithing, it captures the certificates of primary concern (those containing domain names) without excluding internal server name certs. Thoughts?

 

Jeremy

 

From: Brown, Wendy (10421) [mailto:wendy.brown at protiviti.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 03, 2014 12:08 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley; 'Mads Egil Henriksveen'; 'Moudrick M. Dadashov'; public at cabforum.org
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

 

The requirement to verify is in the CP - the details of How goes in the CPS.

 

From: Jeremy Rowley [mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 03, 2014 2:03 PM
To: Brown, Wendy (10421); 'Mads Egil Henriksveen'; 'Moudrick M. Dadashov'; public at cabforum.org
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

 

Thanks Wendy for the clarification.  However, I didn't see anything specifying how the CA is supposed to verify the domain.  

 

From: Brown, Wendy (10421) [mailto:wendy.brown at protiviti.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 03, 2014 11:55 AM
To: Jeremy Rowley; 'Mads Egil Henriksveen'; 'Moudrick M. Dadashov'; public at cabforum.org
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

 

The FBCA and Common Policy CPs actually require all information included in a certificate to be verified - so that would include any domain names, see 3.2.4.

 

Thanks,

Wendy

 

Wendy Brown

FPKIMA Technical Liaison

Protiviti Government Services

703-299-4705 (office)    703-965-2990 (cell)

 

wendy.brown at fpki.gov

wendy.brown at protiviti.com

 

 

 

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley
Sent: Friday, January 03, 2014 11:19 AM
To: 'Mads Egil Henriksveen'; 'Moudrick M. Dadashov'; public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

 

Many of the trusted QC issuers (and other community issuers) are not involved in the CAB Forum.  Although you are aware of the requirements, I don't think this knowledge is global.  For example, I don't think the NIST CP or FBCA CP ever mentions domain validation. A CA following either CP for client certs wouldn't necessarily validate an included domain.

 

Jeremy

 

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Mads Egil Henriksveen
Sent: Friday, January 03, 2014 4:52 AM
To: Moudrick M. Dadashov; Jeremy Rowley; public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

 

Hi Moudrick

 

There might not be a real use case for including a domain name in a QC, but as a trusted CA we take the responsibility for the accuracy of information in all certs we issue. And that was my point and why I am not very concerned about the described attack scenario.  

 

Regards

Mads

 

From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Moudrick M. Dadashov
Sent: 3. januar 2014 11:51
To: Mads Egil Henriksveen; Jeremy Rowley; public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

 

Mads,

On 1/3/2014 11:49 AM, Mads Egil Henriksveen wrote:

	 

	The attack scenario assumes that the QC can be chained to a root cert in a trusted CA root store. This means that the CA should know the root store requirements and should be aware of the risk issuing any cert that could be used as an SSL certificate. 

	 

	Buypass do issue both QC and SSL certificates and with the DigiNotar attack back in 2011 we realized that the browsers do accept a lot of certificates as SSL certificates. Since then we have had strict controls to ensure that no certificate is issued with an unverified domain name. I guess most of the trusted QC issuers who also issue SSL certificates are aware of this, I would not be very concerned about this attack scenario. 

What is the use case when in a QC we'd need a [any/unverified] domain name? (aren't CAs responsible for the accuracy of information in the QCs they issue?). 

 

However, I do support the idea of a technical definition of an SSL certificate and I like the proposal from Ryan Hurst requiring the BR/EV OIDs. 

Under ETSI framework compliance assumes two things: compliance with the corresponding requirements plus certificate profile compliance. These two categories exist as separate documents (under their own ETSI IDs).
Ryan's proposal is definitely a  good step forward, I'd vote with my both hands if we go even further, and like ETSI, have separate BR/EV profile specifications.

Thanks,
M.D.

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