[cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate

Thu Jan 2 17:25:36 UTC 2014

Dear all,

Qualified certificates are intended to identify people, not websites nor
servers. There are no hard constrains regarding the usage of EKU KU values,
but good practices are to use Non-repudiation and only non-repudiation (see
RFC3039 <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3039.txt>, section 3.2.3 in combination
with ETSI TS 102
280<http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/102200_102299/102280/01.01.01_60/ts_102280v010101p.pdf>,
section 5.4.3 and taking into account that Qualified Certificates are
defined with purpose of creation Qualified Electronic Signatures legally
binding!)

In fact any QC contents personal data (or pseudonym but the CSP MUST have
the actual personal data bound to the pseudonym) so I do not think any will
want to put her personal data authenticating a public website.

Since the purpose of a QC is quite different of the purpose of a SSL
certificate and the first is legally constricted I do really think that
BR's do not have to cover QC at all. Maybe it exists but I have never seen
a QC authenticating a website.

IMHO trying to cover QC is going beyond the purpose of the BR, it will mesh
up the whole think without adding security to SSL certificates.

[image: AC Firmaprofesional S.A.] <http://www.firmaprofesional.com/>

*Chema López González AC Firmaprofesional S.A.*

Av. Torre Blanca, 57.
Edificio ESADECREAPOLIS - 1B13

08173 Sant Cugat del Vallès. Barcelona.
Tel: 93.477.42.45 / 666.429.224

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On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Davidson <
S.Davidson at quovadisglobal.com> wrote:

> >  Are qualified certs issued from the same root as BR certs?
>
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] *On
> Behalf Of *Jeremy Rowley
> *Sent:* Thursday, December 19, 2013 12:51 PM
> *To:* i-barreira at izenpe.net; public at cabforum.org
>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate
>
>
>
> So:
>
> 1)      Qualified certs CAN be used for TLS Server Authentication since
> they may include anyEKU or serverAuth in the EKU extension
>
> 2)      Qualified Certs do NOT comply with the BRs, they comply with the
> appropriate ESTI standard.
>
> 3)      Qualified certs are only distinguishable from BR certs because
> qualified certs assert a QCStatement
>
>
>
> Is this a fair summary?
>
>
>
> *From:* public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org<public-bounces at cabforum.org>]
> *On Behalf Of *i-barreira at izenpe.net
>
> *Sent:* Thursday, December 19, 2013 9:25 AM
> *To:* jeremy.rowley at digicert.com; public at cabforum.org
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate
>
>
>
> Yes, but with some additional points
>
>
>
> -          Mark Jansen is right albeit it depends on national
> legislation. In Spain, you have to indicate what EKU is to be used.
>
> -          DV or OV will never be considered Qualified certs. EV possibly
> and will have some impacts
>
>
>
>
>
> *Iñigo Barreira*
> Responsable del Área técnica
> i-barreira at izenpe.net
>
> 945067705
>
>
>
> *[image: Descripción: Descripción: Descripción: firma_izenpe_navid-OK-2]*
>
>
>
> *De:* public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org<public-bounces at cabforum.org>]
> *En nombre de *Jeremy Rowley
> *Enviado el:* jueves, 19 de diciembre de 2013 17:06
> *Para:* CABFPub
> *Asunto:* [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate
>
>
>
> We are looking to clarify the scope of the BRs.  Right now the BR scope is
> very loose and subjective: “This version of the Requirements only addresses
> Certificates intended to be used for authenticating servers  accessible
> through the Internet.”
>
>
>
> This loose definition excludes internal names (which are not typically
> accessible through the Internet), a type of certificate the BRs are clearly
> designed to regulate (see 11.1.4).  In addition, a CA could easily issue a
> certificate outside of the BRs  that could later be used in a TLS/SSL
> attack simply because the certificate wasn’t intended to be used for SSL.
>
>
>
> Issuance of certificates outside the BRs may not be intentional,
> especially by CAs who aren’t regularly issuing SSL certificates.  These CAs
> may not be aware that the BRs apply to their certificates and may not
> realize their client certificates could be used for SSL since
> “authenticating servers” is not a well-defined term.
>
>
>
> Clarifying the scope will ensure that every CA is aware of the minimum
> standards and what they cover.  Originally, the idea was to tie the scope
> to the values in the EKU.  Unfortunately, there are several obstacles to
> this approach:
>
> 1)      Grid Certificates require serverAuth in the EKU.  It’s unclear
> whether these certs should be covered.
>
> 2)      Per 5280, browsers treat the absence of an EKU and the anyEKU as
> serverAuth, meaning they are enabled for TLS Server Authentication.
>
> 3)      The FBCA requires anyEKU in several certificates.  These are
> clearly client certificates and are outside the BR scope.
>
> 4)      Qualified certificates in the EU have either the anyEKU present
> or omit the EKU.  They are client certs and clearly not covered by the
> BRs.  However, they can be used  for server authentication.
>
>
>
> For qualified certificates, Moudrick provided the following guidance:
>
> “Certificates using applications MAY require that the extended key usage
> extension be present and that a particular purpose be indicated in order
> for the certificate to be acceptable to that application.
>
>
>
> If a CA includes extended key usages to satisfy such applications, but
> does not wish to restrict usages of the key, the CA can include the special
> KeyPurposeId anyExtendedKeyUsage ***in addition to the particular key
> purposes required by the applications***.
>
>
>
> So a QC pretending to be RFC 5280/BR and ETSI (web server QCs) compliant
> would have to at least have:
>
>
>
> QC + [anyEKU] + id-kp-serverAuth + {DV/OV/EV}
>
>
>
> I'm quite confident that the absolute majority of QCs issued so far (that
> have anyEKU, see Mark Janssen's 08/08/2013 - thank you Stephen) do not
> contain any DV/OV/EV policy IDs, so why not accept them as BR compliant but
> not sufficient for TSL/SSL establishment?
>
>
>
> In order for a QC to have a TSL/SSL capability, BR may require:
>
>
>
> QC + {{id-kp-serverAuth and/or id-kp-clientAuth} + {DV/OV/EV}} (optionally
> no anyKEY allowed).
>
>
>
> A practical interpretation: a WEB server that also does some web site
> related document/content signing.”
>
>
>
> There appears to be a significant conflict between the CAB Forum’s work
> and the standards set by other bodies.  In particular, their use of the
> anyEKU or omission of an EKU is permitting the realm of client certs to
> overlap SSL certs.  Approaching each government body to stop this practice
> is not feasible and will take a very long time to complete
>
>
>
> Hopefully this summary helps inspire ideas on where we can go from here.
> I’m looking forward to ideas.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org
> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
>
>
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