[cabfpub] Proposal for modified Google SHA-1 deprecation policy

Ryan Sleevi rsleevi at chromium.org
Fri Aug 29 02:13:34 UTC 2014


Hi Kirk,

I feel like I have sufficiently explained our concerns and motivations
throughout this thread, with both you and other CAs, that it should be
readily apparent that this neither meets our goals nor helps our users.

I appreciate your thoughtful consideration in writing it.

Best,
Ryan
On Aug 28, 2014 7:04 PM, "kirk_hall at trendmicro.com" <
kirk_hall at trendmicro.com> wrote:

>    Ryan and Chris – here is a serious proposal for a modified Google
> SHA-1 policy.  It meets all of your stated goals.  Please give it some
> consideration.
>
>
>
> 1.  SHA-1 certs issued on or after [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or after
> January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google upon issuance – red
> slash and nasty click-throughs.  (This will stop issuance of 2017 SHA-1
> certs this fall.)
>
>
>
> 2.  SHA-1 certs issued before [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or after
> January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google starting [March 1,
> 2015] – red slash only and nasty click-throughs.   (This will force
> existing websites with 2017 SHA-1 certs to change them within the next six
> months).
>
>
>
> Result: All 2017 SHA-1 certs will be gone by next March 2015 – which
> certainly meets your goals.  Customers with existing 2017 certs can get
> through this holiday season, CAs can get the message out.
>
>
>
> Advantages:
>
>
>
> 1.  CAs that have never issued 2017 certs, and never will (like Trend
> Micro) and their customers are not affected – that’s appropriate, as we
> have never been a part of this problem.
>
>
>
> 2.  CAs that have issued three year SHA-1 certs expiring in 2017 will stop
> by this fall.
>
>
>
> 3.  CAs that have issued 2017 certs in the past (and their customers) will
> be affected, but will have six months to adjust.  That will be a much
> smaller number of customers affected than if those with 2016 certs are
> forced to change their certs twice (in 2014 and again in 2015).
>
>
>
> 4.  All SHA-1 certs will likely be gone by next spring.
>
>
>
> I don’t think Google should spend much time worrying about how CAs
> communicate with their customers about the need to move to SHA-256 before
> 2017 – that’s for us to worry about, and we are all strongly incentivized
> to get the message out (selling a 2017 cert that doesn’t work creates legal
> problems, and none of us wants to be dealing with angry SHA-1 customers in
> late 2016 who have to switch to SHA-256).  We may also be able to get
> behind Google’s policy if it is revised – something that isn’t the case
> today.
>
>
>
> You mentioned somewhere that you worried that simply deprecating SHA-1
> certs as of 2017 could create a big customer service burden on Google as of
> late 2016 or early 2017.  I don’t think that’s the case with this new
> proposed policy, as all the negative UI effects will happen in 2014-15.
> Plus, I predict Google will be deluged with customer service complaints
> under your current policy, when thousands of websites start showing as
> “untrusted” in the next 6-12 weeks.  Why not make life easier for Google
> with a revised policy?
>
>
>
> So what do you think?  Can we make a change to the policy that is focused
> on the real problem (2017 certs)?
>
>
>
> Thanks for your consideration.
>
>
>
> *Kirk R. Hall*
>
> Operations Director, Trust Services
>
> Trend Micro
>
>
>
>
>
>
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