[cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

[Kelvin Yiu]

I prefer to drop any mention of the MS or Netscape SGC OIDs. These OIDs have been obsolete for over a decade and have ceased to have any meaning on MS platforms since Windows 2000. 

Kelvin

-----Original Message-----
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi
Sent: Friday, July 26, 2013 12:35 PM
To: jeremy rowley
Cc: CABFPub
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements

Jeremy,

If I might suggest a slight modification to the wording, which still leaves things a little ambiguous. "All root and intermediate certificates included in a browser's trust store" - AIUI, none of the browsers are really accepting intermediates to the trust store at this point.

This was a sticky point when working on Mozilla's wording on this policy to. Luckily, the terminology for "Root CA" and "Subordinate CA"
may be sufficient here to help clarify.

"All root certificates included in a browser's trust store, all subordinate CA certificates signed by one of these root certificates, and all end-entity certificates that either lack any Extended Key Usage extension or contain an Extended Key Usage extension that contains one of the following:
- Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
- anyExtendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37.0)
- Netscape Server Gated Cryptography (2.16.840.1.113730.4.1)
- Microsoft Server Gated Cryptography (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.3) are expressly covered by these requirements."

Note that Appendix B, 3.F lists other values as SHOULD NOT. However, that presumably only applies when a certificate is 'in scope' of the BRs, hence the restatement of potential EKUs that are relevant.



On Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 12:22 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> As mentioned on the phone call last week, CAs have claimed exemption 
> from the BRs because the definition of a publicly-trusted SSL certificate is not
> clear.   I would like to clarify the scope of the BRs to avoid confusion on
> what particular certificate contents are necessary to require 
> compliance.  I am looking for on endorser (Stephen Davidson has already endorsed).
>
>
>
> The third paragraph of Section 1 of the baseline requirements is:
>
> "This version of the Requirements only addresses Certificates intended 
> to be used for authenticating servers  accessible through the 
> Internet. Similar requirements for code signing, S/MIME, 
> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web services, etc. may be covered in future versions."
>
>
>
> I'd like to replace the above text with the following:
>
> "This version of the Baseline Requirements addresses all root, 
> intermediate, and end entity certificates that can be used in 
> publicly-trusted SSL handshakes.  All root and intermediate 
> certificates included in a browser's trust store and all end entity 
> certificates containing an extended key usage extension of Server 
> Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) are expressly covered by these 
> requirements. Similar requirements for code signing, S/MIME, 
> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web services, etc. may be covered in future versions."
>
>
>
> I look forward to your comments.
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
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