[cabfpub] BR Requirements for 1024-bit Certificates

[Rob Stradling]

Section "1. Scope" says:
"Except where explicitly stated otherwise, these requirements apply only 
to relevant events that occur on or after the Effective Date."

For 1024-bit certs that were issued before the Effective Date and which 
expire after Dec 31st 2013, what "relevant event...on or after the 
Effective Date" are we talking about that would cause the BRs to become 
applicable?

(I wouldn't classify "a cert continues to be both unexpired and 
unrevoked" as an "event").

On 31/01/13 22:29, Rick Andrews wrote:
> We support changing the date in the BR, as we have tens of thousands of
> such certs, many issued long before the BR was enacted. It would be
> extremely disruptive to many of our customers to replace them early.
>
> I agree that we don’t want to wait until the catastrophe arrives, but
> AFAIK the largest number factored was less than 800 bits. Factoring a
> 1024-bit number is far, far more difficult. If there is consensus for a
> ballot, I would endorse it.
>
> -Rick
>
> *From:*public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
> *On Behalf Of *Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
> *Sent:* Thursday, January 31, 2013 2:12 PM
> *To:* public at cabforum.org
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] BR Requirements for 1024-bit Certificates
>
>
> On 01/31/2013 11:58 PM, From Wayne Thayer:
>
> I'm not yet aware of any known practical brute force attack on 1024 bit
> RSA keys.  On the other hand, it is clear that there will be a major
> impact on existing SSL sites as CAs work to rekey 10's of thousands of
> certificates this year.  I'd like to propose that we extend the deadline
> in the BRs for revoking existing certs with 1024 bit keys pending
> further evidence of a practical vulnerability.  Do others support this
> change?
>
>
> No, at least we don't - those that took steps to ensure adequate keys
> sizes in the past were at a disadvantage when refusing to sign
> certificate with smaller keys. Today with the BR in place, the same
> rules are applied throughout the industry and I don't consider it a good
> idea to roll back on this (and other issues) which we finally nailed down.
>
> Additionally we don't have to wait for the catastrophe to arrive in
> order to take actions, we really should be at least a half-step ahead.
>
> Finally do I consider a promise to revoke such certificates in December
> 2013 not compliant to the BR - and probably also not to some of the
> software vendors requirements if I recall correctly. So your statement
> is correct, that as of today there shouldn't be any certificates with a
> validity of a year and more with 1024 bit keys.
>
> Regards
>
> Signer:
>
> 	
>
> Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO
>
> 	
>
> StartCom Ltd. <http://www.startcom.org>
>
> XMPP:
>
> 	
>
> startcom at startcom.org <xmpp:startcom at startcom.org>
>
> Blog:
>
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>
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>
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-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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