[cabfpub] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)

Fri Oct 26 21:15:26 UTC 2012

I just realized that Robin's revision seems incorrect. Yngve intended that 3 would be treated as a valid exponent (I believe that's what he intended), but 3 is not in the range below.

-Rick

> -----Original Message-----
> From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
> On Behalf Of Robin Alden
> Sent: Friday, October 26, 2012 3:09 AM
> To: 'Yngve N. Pettersen (Developer Opera Software ASA)'; 'CABFMAN';
> 'Ben Wilson'
> Cc: public at cabforum.org
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues
> 6, 8, 10, 21)
> 
> Comodo votes 'yes' based on Yngve's clarification that the effective
> date would be "Immediate" and that for the RSA public exponent there
> was a typo and that part of the motion should read, "The value of the
> public exponent MUST be an odd number equal to 3 or more, it SHOULD be
> in the range between
> 65,537 (= (2^16)+1) and (2^256)-1."
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-
> > bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Yngve N. Pettersen (Developer
> Opera
> > Software ASA)
> > Sent: 25 October 2012 16:33
> > To: CABFMAN; Ben Wilson
> > Cc: public at cabforum.org
> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot [93] - Reasons for Revocation (BR
> issues
> 6,
> > 8, 10, 21)
> >
> >
> > Opera Software votes Yes.
> >
> > On Thu, 18 Oct 2012 01:16:36 +0200, Ben Wilson <ben at digicert.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Ballot 93 - Reasons for Revocation (BR issues 6, 8, 10, 21)
> > >
> > > Yngve N. Pettersen (Opera) made the following motion, endorsed by
> > > Jeremy Rowley, Digicert and Robin Alden, Comodo:
> > >
> > > --- Motion begins ---
> > >
> > > Effective <DTBD>
> > >
> > > Erratum begins:
> > >
> > > A. (Issue #8)
> > >
> > > Add the following as 10.2.5:
> > >
> > > "10.2.5 Subordinate CA Private Key
> > >
> > > Parties other than the Subordinate CA SHALL NOT archive the
> > > Subordinate CA Private Keys. If the Issuing CA generated the
> Private
> > > Key on behalf of the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL
> > encrypt
> > > the Private Key for transport to the Subordinate CA. If the Issuing
> CA
> > > becomes aware that a Subordinate CA's Private Key has been
> > > communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not
> > > affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL
> revoke
> > > all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the
> > > communicated Private Key."
> > >
> > > B. (Issue #8)
> > >
> > > . Replace the heading of section 13.1.5 with "Reasons for Revoking
> a
> > > Subscriber Certificate"
> > >
> > > . Add the following as section 13.1.6:
> > >
> > > "13.1.6 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate
> > >
> > > The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within
> seven
> > > (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:
> > >
> > > 1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
> > >
> > > 2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original
> > > certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively
> > > grant authorization;
> > >
> > > 3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's
> Private
> > > Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a
> Key
> > > Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Appendix
> > A,
> > >
> > > 4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was
> misused;
> > >
> > > 5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued
> in
> > > accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with these
> > > Baseline Requirements or the applicable Certificate Policy or
> > > Certification Practice Statement;
> > >
> > > 6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing
> in
> > > the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
> > >
> > > 7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any
> reason
> > > and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation
> > > support for the Certificate;
> > >
> > > 8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates
> > > under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated,
> unless
> > > the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the
> > > CRL/OCSP Repository;
> > >
> > > 9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy
> > > and/or Certification Practice Statement; or
> > >
> > > 10. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an
> > > unacceptable risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying
> Parties
> > > (e.g.
> > > the CA/Browser Forum might determine that a deprecated
> > > cryptographic/signature algorithm or key size presents an
> unacceptable
> > > risk and that such Certificates should be revoked and replaced by
> CAs
> > > within a given period of time)."
> > >
> > > C. (Issue #6)
> > >
> > > .Replace Section 13.1.5(3) with: "(3) The CA obtains evidence that
> the
> > > Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the
> > > Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (also see Section 10.2.4) or
> no
> > > longer complies with the requirements of Appendix A,"
> > >
> > > .Add the following as a new Section 13.1.5(4) and renumber the
> > > remaining bullet points:
> > >
> > > "(4) The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;"
> > >
> > > .Replace the definition of Key Compromise with the following:
> > >
> > > "Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its
> value
> > > has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized
> person
> > > has had access to it, or there exists a practical technique by
> which
> > > an unauthorized person may discover its value. A Private Key is
> also
> > > considered compromised if methods have been developed that can
> > easily
> > > calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key,
> see
> > > http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys)
> > > or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to
> > > generate the Private Key was flawed."
> > >
> > > D. (Issue #21)
> > >
> > > Add new section 13.2.7: "13.2.7 Certificate Suspension.
> > >
> > > The Repository MUST NOT include entries that indicate that a
> > > Certificate is suspended."
> > >
> > > E. (Issue #10)
> > >
> > > Add the following after Appendix A, table (3):
> > >
> > > "(4) General requirements for public keys: Public keys SHOULD
> follow
> > > the recommendations of NIST SP 800-73-3
> > > <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78-3/sp800-78-3.pdf
> > > <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78-3/sp800-78-
> > 3.pdf%3E
> > > > >
> > >
> > > RSA: The value of the public exponent MUST be an odd number equal
> > to 3
> > > or more, it SHOULD be in the range 65537 (216+1) to 2256-1."
> > >
> > > Erratum ends
> > >
> > > ... Motion ends ...
> > >
> > > The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 17
> > > October
> > > 2012 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 24 October 2012. Unless the
> motion
> > > is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start
> > > immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 31 October
> 2012.
> > > Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.
> > >
> > > ... Motions ends ...
> > >
> > > A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the
> > > response.
> > >
> > > A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote
> to
> > > abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear
> > > responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any
> > > representative of a voting member before the close of the voting
> > > period will be counted.
> > >
> > > Voting members are listed here:
> > http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
> > >
> > > In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the
> votes
> > > cast by members in the CA category and one half or more of the
> votes
> > > cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at
> > > least six members must participate in the ballot, either by voting
> in
> > > favor, voting against or abstaining.
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Sincerely,
> > Yngve N. Pettersen
> > *******************************************************
> > *************
> > Senior Developer		     Email: yngve at opera.com
> > Opera Software ASA                   http://www.opera.com/
> > Phone:  +47 96 90 41 51              Fax:    +47 23 69 24 01
> > *******************************************************
> > *************
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